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The extreme interconnectedness of energy and economic systems will tend to confound any 
attempt to estimate the energy return on investment at anything other than the global scale. 
Here, I apply a very simple model of global energy use to specify the dynamic characteristics 
of global-scale Energy Returns On Investment (EROIG). This suggests that the observed 
long-run relative growth rate of ~2.5 % yr-1 in global primary energy use is associated with an 
equilibrium return from infrastructure investments of 2:1, with returns accruing with a time 
constant of 40 years. The analysis also attempts to show how growth leads to reductions in 
the supply efficiency of energy, and how this decline is offset by increases in the efficiency 
with which industrial society can extract useful work from primary energy flows. This 
observed preservation of the overall energy efficiency of the global energy system implicates 
variations in the decay/decommissioning rate of infrastructure in observed ‘long-wave’ like 
variations in the relative growth rate of global primary energy use, and hence EROIG. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Because of the way economies co-evolve with their use of energy, it is hard to be precise 
about the nature of the dependencies between the two (Stern, 2010). However, in standard 
economic frameworks, energy use is generally assigned around 5 % of productivity in line 
with observed short-term production costs (Dennison, 1979; Ayres and Warr, 2010; Kummel, 
2011). This appears to contrast with everyday experience, which suggests that, like food, 
energy use is central to all socioeconomic activity, and if energy flows were withdrawn, 
global economic output would cease entirely rather than simply falling by 5 % (Ayres and 
Nair, 1984). The centrality of energy use to the global economy is also underscored by the 
fact that many of the largest manmade infrastructures on the planet are for energy 
acquisition, distribution and use, and likewise many of the largest companies in the world 
(http://fortune.com/global500/list/). 
Observations such as these, along with the growing importance of understanding drivers of 
energy use and resultant greenhouse gas emissions, have encouraged a growing number of 
researchers to favour placing energy at the heart of their analysis of industrial society, rather 
than it being a somewhat peripheral factor of production. Such approaches naturally lean 
toward either thermodynamic (e.g. Garrett, 2011), or metabolic (e.g. Cleveland et al., 1984) 
frameworks, because of the explicit and central framing around energy flows, and their role 
in maintaining and developing the form and function of systems and processes. Although 
some have attempted to integrate both economic and biophysical perspectives (e.g. Ayres 
and Warr, 2010; Kummel, 2011), there tends to be a tension between the two approaches, 
given that one emphasises the primacy of people in determining system behaviour, whereas 
the other emphasises the primacy of biophysical regularities, such as the first and second 
laws of thermodynamics. 
Energy Return On Investment (EROI) has been a valuable concept in helping bridge these 
economic and biophysical perspectives by articulating the potential viability of energy 
sources in relation to their yield of net available energy to industrial society (Cleveland et al., 
1984; Hall et al., 1986). However, despite its conceptual elegance, EROI has proved 
particularly difficult to define and measure because this requires the demarcation of 
process/system boundaries. As with any such process-based analysis, the complexity of the 
wider economic system(s), and in particular the nature of the interlinkages between 
components, makes the definition of clear internal boundaries problematic at best. 
Rather than considering the energy returns of individual energy sources as is commonly 
done, one way of simplifying matters could be to take the entire global energy system and its 
associated portfolio as a whole. At the global aggregate scale, the system boundaries that 
define energy returns are potentially far simpler because one generally avoids the need to 
identify internal system boundaries, whilst the global boundary is comparatively well defined 
by the flow of primary energy from the environment into industrial society. This is also the 
scale at which the critical impacts of climate change and the required transitions in the global 
energy portfolio are framed and, as a result, such an analysis might bring some much-
needed clarity to an otherwise notoriously complicated but important space. Therefore, 
although one may sacrifice detail on specific processes at this scale, and some of the 
derived states may become somewhat abstracted from everyday micro-experience, 
removing internal boundary ambiguities may provide a clearer picture of the systemic drivers 
of global energy use. 
In this paper, I develop a global-scale analysis of energy returns based on recent work by 
Jarvis et al., (2015). In that work, they present a very simple endogenous growth model that 
attempts to account for two important observed features of the historic pattern of global 
primary energy use (GPE): a. that the long-run relative growth rate has been somewhat 
conserved at ~2.5 % yr-1; and b. that the fraction of this energy that is used to acquire and 
relocate resources has increased as the system has grown. These observations have 
several important implications for energy return analysis. First, overall rates of return on 
energy use must be also be somewhat conserved at the global scale if the relative growth 
rate of primary energy use is similarly conserved. Secondly, any observed historic declines 
in specific energy return measures such as EROI (e.g. Murphy and Hall, 2011), may be 
related to growth-induced increases in resource supply costs, but these declines must be 
offset by increases in the efficiency of energy use elsewhere in the system, in order to 
produce a somewhat stationary long-run relative growth rate. Finally, a process experiencing 
~2.5 % yr-1 growth has a dynamic timescale of 0.025-1 = 40 years and, as a result, energy 
investments on average yield returns over such timescales. Therefore, measures such as 
EROI need to consider the dynamics operating over these timescales (Dale et al., 2012a). 
The aim of this paper is to illustrate these three points and relate them to our understanding 
and management of the global energy system. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sets out the global-scale endogenous growth 
model. Section 3 then uses this model to develop a dynamic definition of global EROI, 
EROIG. Section 4 explores how growth-induced increases in resource supply costs lead to 
declining energy returns, but also how these might be balanced by adjustments in efficiency 
elsewhere in the system such that overall returns and hence growth is maintained. Section 5 
explores systematic variations in observed growth rates of GPE about their long-run value, 
and Section 6 offers some conclusions. 
 
2.0 Modelling framework 
There are numerous global energy system models (see Jebaraj and Iniyan, 2006; 
Bhattacharyya and Timilsina 2010 for reviews) that vary in complexity depending on 
application. Here I present possibly one of the simplest in that it makes no attempt to resolve 
any detail beyond what is necessary to describe the observations that a. GPE use has, on 
average, grown at ~2.5 % yr-1 for at least the last century, and b. the efficiency of supplying 
resources to points of final consumption has fallen consistently as the system has grown 
(see below). In this framework, energy use is assumed to underpin all economic activity such 
that the real economy and the global energy system represent one and the same thing over 
the timescales being considered.  
 
Components of primary energy use 
GPE is the total annual energy consumption (or annual average power demand) of industrial 
society made up from wood, fossil fuels, renewables, nuclear and food. Estimates of this for 
1900 to 2014 compiled by De Stercke (2014) are shown in Figure 1i, and currently (in 2014) 
this is around 600 EJ yr-1 or 19 TW. Let us denote GPE, x. Although this energy flow is used 
for a vast array of differing activities, here I start by considering it as being comprised of just 
two components: the energy used to acquire resources from the environment and to 
distribute them within industrial society (or the supply energy use, xS); and the residual that is 
net available to do things beyond resource acquisition and distribution (or net available 
energy use, xA). 
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Defining the partitioning of primary energy use outlined in equation (1) is nontrivial. This is 
because energy used for resource supply includes both the running cost (which see 
instantaneous returns), and investments in the associated infrastructure (which see returns 
over the investment timescale). The former are commonly accounted for in annual energy 
input-output statistics such as those reported by the International Energy Agency (IEA). 
These are associated with the operation of infrastructure for the extraction and relocation of 
resources from where they are in the environment, to where they are needed within 
industrial society. Although there are considerable uncertainties associated with the 
specification of these costs (for example, points of end-use are invariably treated as points of 
sale for convenience), it is the uncertainties surrounding the embedded energy invested in 
the associated infrastructure that present the biggest challenge (Dale et al., 2012a). The 
reason for this is because there are no clear system boundaries for these investments 
because a. the associated supply chains are infinite, b. this stock of infrastructure is the 
product of all prior investments, and c. all infrastructure is networked together. As a result, 
defining the infrastructure investment component of xS encounters the same truncation error 
problems that plague all process-based life-cycle analyses when one is analysing sub-
components of global systems (Hendrickson et al., 1998; Lenzen, 2001).  
In addition to taking a global perspective, one way to overcome the difficulty associated with 
specifying infrastructure in equation (1) is to re-define xS such that it only accounts for 
running resource supply processes, with some or all of xA being used for investing in 
infrastructure. This marks an important departure from standard practice in EROI analysis 
which invariably attempts to include running costs alongside infrastructure investments. In 
my framework, running costs are simply committed expenditure to operate existing 
infrastructure, whereas investments represent choices over what infrastructure to create 
using net available energy. This approach provides an unambiguous physical demarcation in 
the system because investments are associated exclusively with the transition of energy 
flows into infrastructural stocks at points of ‘end use.’ Put another way, energy is used to 
either move mass, or make infrastructure, with only the latter constituting investment. 
Furthermore, infrastructure is, therefore, defined by the embodiment of energy in specific 
configurations of resource-derived materials, and the function of this infrastructure is to 
facilitate access to future resource flows (Garrett, 2012). 
Before seeing how investments of net available energy lead to the accumulation of 
infrastructure, it is important to acknowledge that, although we have separated processes of 
acquisition/distribution and infrastructure fabrication here to reflect the difference between 
running costs and investments in infrastructure, these processes occur intermittently 
throughout the system. As such, they are very difficult to separate spatially. For example, the 
energy used to do the work of digging coal from the ground and relocate it to a steel plant is 
clearly an acquisition/distribution flow. That coal can then be invested to smelt ore to 
produce a stock of steel, which is part of an infrastructure forming process. However, that 
steel can then be relocated back through a supply chain to make a bucket wheel excavator 
for harvesting more coal, with the making of the excavator parts from the steel requiring yet 
more investment of net available energy, and the relocation of these steel parts and their 
assembly requiring yet more supply energy use. Interestingly, the flow of coal from the mine 
is the flow of energy and its mass carrier (largely carbon). However, the movement of the 
steel is also a flow of energy and mass, and we refer to that energy as the embodied energy 
in the steel. As a result, the networks moving resources through industrial society are always 
moving mixtures of both energy and mass (Jarvis et al., 2015). 
Dale et al., (2012b) also differentiate explicitly between capital investments and running 
costs when modelling the EROI of the global energy system. They specify infrastructure 
associated with energy acquisition and distribution, and that which is associated with other 
functions performed by industrial society. Although an appealing and obvious choice to 
make, and the prevailing view of energy systems, this approach raises a critical issue: is it 
correct to differentiate between energy producing infrastructure, such as an oil rig, and what 
is perceived to be non-energy producing (and hence by implication ‘useful’) infrastructure, 
such as a house? In an energy system sense, it can be argued that the house is as 
necessary for acquiring and distributing energy resources as the oil rig, because it houses 
those servicing and operating the system, either directly or indirectly. Similarly, the oil rig is 
as integrated into the fabric of industrial society as the house, if we believe there is such a 
thing as a global energy system, where all components are connected by 
acquisition/distribution networks. Furthermore, both the house and the oil rig are constructed 
from the fraction of x that is not used to either acquire or distribute resources, so the addition 
of either a house or an oil rig to industrial society must be considered to be material growth 
of the system. Therefore, although we might believe the house is somehow more ‘useful,’ 
and hence more closely linked to net available energy flows, this distinction is possibly an 
illusion in terms of the global energy system, given the highly interconnected nature of 
infrastructure and its ubiquitous use of energy. 
There is a direct parallel here with biological systems such as the body. The fabric of the 
human body includes all distribution infrastructure (mouth, throat, intestine, bronchi, arteries, 
veins, lymph system, etc.), and the growth of the body includes material additions to, or 
investments in these networks, as much as it does to the soft and hard tissues these 
networks service with resources. Furthermore, these soft and hard tissues support the 
operation of the acquisition/distribution systems, as the acquisition/distribution systems 
support the operation of these tissues. Together, they form an integrated whole that we call 
the body, in the same way that acquisition/distribution systems are part of the integrated 
whole of industrial society. Therefore, differentiating between elements of either the body or 
industrial society based on ‘usefulness’ is largely arbitrary. As a result, I adopt the possibly 
surprising position that, at the global scale, xA is used exclusively for investing in 
infrastructure, and that we make no distinction between energy and non-energy 
infrastructure: all infrastructure is used for energy acquisition and distribution either directly 
or indirectly (Garrett, 2012). Therefore, xS is used exclusively to run infrastructure and hence 
is not an investment per se.  
 
Growth in energy use 
In addition to GPE, Figure 1i also shows an estimate of Gross World Product (GWP) 1900 to 
2014, again taken from De Stercke (2014). Although there is significant variability about the 
trend (see Section 5), by far the dominant feature of these data, explaining more than 95 % 
of the variance (see Table 1), is the underlying tendency for growth to be exponential in both 
GWP and GPE. Using these data, I estimate that GPE expresses a long-run relative growth 
rate of 2.7 (± 0.04) % yr-1 and GWP 3.1 (± 0.04) % yr-1 (Table 1) suggesting they share a 
common exponential scaling relationship (Figure 1i inset). Using a slightly different 
compilation of GPE based on the Grübler (2008) and British Petroleum (2011) data, Jarvis et 
al., (2012; 2015) estimated that the 1850 to 2010 relative growth rate of GPE was 2.4 (± 
0.04) % yr-1. As a result, it appears there is some sensitivity of this estimate to the data 
length and sources used. As a result, hereon I will assume a rounded value for the long run 
relative growth rate of GPE of 2.5 % yr-1 to avoid over-reporting the precision with which we 
know this number.  
The analysis hereon focuses largely on the first order exponentiality of GPE.  Not only is this 
the overriding feature of the evolution of these data, but growth is the central economic 
calculus of the current global socioeconomic system, and it is hard to envisage this altering 
for the foreseeable future without some form of radical, systemic change, precipitated by 
either foresight, or physical limits. Moreover, it appears that this central calculus is not simply 
growth, but the appearance of preferred growth rates, with periods above this considered 
unwanted inflationary episodes, and periods below considered unwanted recessionary 
episodes. For reference, Figure 1iii shows an estimate of these underlying variations in the 
relative growth rate in GPE which give a strong impression of there being a ‘long-wave’ in 
this measure of the global economy (see Section 5; see also Jarvis and Hewitt, 2014; Manoli 
et al., 2016). 
A relative growth rate of r = 2.5 % yr-1 corresponds to a growth timescale of r-1 = 40 yrs. 
Jarvis et al., (2015) offer an argument based on working lifetimes as to why growth of this 
kind is preferred in the real economy. Briefly, growth rates of this order can be seen as 
optimal if you are attempting to maximise returns over your working lifetime, in order to 
secure prospects in retirement (Jarvis et al., 2015). As we will discuss later, this highlights 
why pensions are an important investment instrument for securing long-run growth. We also 
now have a definition of long-run, i.e. behaviour expressed on this ~40-year timescale. Not 
only is this justified because of the dominance of exponentiality in the data in Figure 1, from 
a climate change perspective, the climate system receiving the associated anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions is, in effect, a low-pass filter, responding only to the long-run 
dynamics of industrial society. As a result, we rightly focus on these dynamics above all else 
when considering avoiding dangerous climate change. Furthermore, only a modest lag is 
required in any socioeconomic feedback regulating growth at ~2.5 % yr-1 to produce the type 
of variations seen in Figure 1iii. 
Following Garrett (2011), the energy-related growth in the real economy is ultimately 
determined by the feedback between investments of energy in the material fabric of society 
(which hereon we refer to as ‘infrastructure’), X, and the use of this infrastructure in the 
acquisition of primary energy flows, x. Infrastructure can be thought of as the embodiment of 
energy investments within materials (Garrett, 2012), and hence the conservation of these 
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where η is the fraction of the primary energy flow x that drives infrastructure creation, and k 
is the average decay rate of that infrastructure. 
The average lifetime of large energy infrastructure appears to be ~40 years (Davis et al., 
2010), giving a turnover rate of 40-1 = 2.5 % yr-1 for this stock. This is also the average 
timescale that technologies appear to diffuse into the global economy (Grübler et al., 1999) 
and hence, by implication, leave it. Therefore, we might conclude that the turnover of all 
infrastructure is somehow regulated by the turnover of large energy infrastructure which 
provides the skeleton of the real economy. Because this is also the long-run relative growth 
rate of x, it appears this growth rate is mirrored in the turnover rate of infrastructure, a 
situation that would be optimal if innovation and the introduction of new infrastructure were 
required to maintain real growth at this rate (Jarvis et al., 2015). From these observations, I 
infer k ≈ r on average across the global infrastructure portfolio. This of course masks the fact 
that there is considerable variation about this figure, with some infrastructure turning over 
much more rapidly (e.g. a paper cup) and some much less so (e.g. a road or rail cutting). 
Given equation (2), for x to be long-run exponential, as shown in Figure 1, there must be 
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where λ is the effective residence time of the energy flowing through the infrastructure of 
industrial society. We are now able to describe the endogenous real growth of industrial 





     (4a) 





     (4b) 
with respect to primary energy use. 
If k = r, then to get a relative growth rate of 2.5 % yr-1 in both X and x, annual additions to 
infrastructure must be twice the decay rate. Therefore, from equation (4b), η/λ = 2k = 2r. By 
definition, annual energy flows are fully consumed within the year and hence have an 
effective residence time of λ = 1 yr. If so then η = 0.05 i.e. overall, in the long-run, industrial 
society is 5 % efficient at translating the annual primary energy flow into material additions of 
infrastructure. Ayres (1989) estimated that the US energy system was 2.5 % efficient when 
translating primary energy flows into material growth whilst Kummel (2011) estimates this to 
be closer to 10 %. If 5 % of x is translated into infrastructure creation, the remaining ~95 % 
must be committed to the annual running costs of the real economy and waste.  
 
Global energy use efficiencies 
η is the dimensionless efficiency with which primary energy use drives infrastructure creation 
and can be thought of as the product of a series of efficiencies describing how energy flows 
from the environment to points of final use where infrastructure is created. Here I consider 
the following fundamental components of this aggregate efficiency as being, 
U S M
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where ηU is the efficiency of the primary energy portfolio at doing useful work, ηS is the 
efficiency of the supply networks linking environmental energy sources to points of end use 
(which in this case are the points of manufacture of X), and ηM is the efficiency of the final 
embodiment of end-use energy into physical infrastructure through manufacturing. 
In addition to GPE data, Figure 1i also shows estimates of both ‘final’ and ‘useful’ energy 
1900 – 2014 taken from the De Stercke (2014) database. The difference between the 
primary and useful energy measures the proportion of primary energy able to do work 
throughout the system (Grübler, 2012). The difference between primary and final energy is 
the energy used to relocate energy and its mass carriers from the environment to where it is 
needed. These data are derived from the IEA final energy estimates where final is defined as 
point of sale for convenience. However, this treats all transport as a final use when, clearly, 
transport is the movement of embodied energy and its mass carriers, including people. As a 
result, here I have also removed all transport from the final energy data in the De Stercke 
(2014) database. Jarvis, et al. (2015) also remove all energy used in mining, quarrying, 
fishing and agriculture given these activities are also associated with relocating energy and 
mass carriers from the environment to points of final consumption. Unfortunately, the De 
Stercke (2014) database does not have these sub-categories of energy use and, therefore, 
the final energy data presented in Figure 1 will be an over-estimate relative to those 
compiled by Jarvis, et al. (2015). 
I take the final energy data shown in Figure 1i to be the energy that is net available to create 
infrastructure, xA. Figure 1ii also shows the ratio of final to primary energy flow, xA/x, for the 
period 1900 to 2014 using the De Stercke (2014) data. I take this ratio to be the efficiency of 
the supply system delivering energy (including embodied energy) to points of end use, ηS. 
This is currently ~0.5 and has fallen throughout the observation period (see Figure 1ii, 
Section 4 and also Jarvis et al., 2015 for extensive discussion of this). To reiterate, included 
in this estimate of supply efficiency are all energetic losses that occur between 
environmental source and the sinks at points of end-use where infrastructure is 
manufactured. Also presented in Figure 1ii is an estimate of the usefulness efficiency, ηU. 
Because De Sterke (2014) specifies useful energy flow downstream of the final energy flow, 
this estimate has been taken as the average of the ratios of useful to primary and useful to 
final energy flows hence assuming usefulness remains unchanged as flows traverse the 
energy supply system.. I estimate ηM = η / ηU / ηS because I am assuming λ = 1 yr and η = 
0.05 (see Section 4 also). 
In summary, the relative growth rate of the infrastructure of industrial society (or its annual 
primary energy use) is determined by four factors in this analysis: the residence time of 
annual energy flows (λ); the efficiency with which primary energy can do useful work (ηU); 
the efficiency with which energy is supplied to points of final use (ηS); the efficiency with 
which this end-use energy flow is translated into infrastructure additions (ηM); and the decay 
rate of that infrastructure (k). These factors determine energy returns and return rates in this 
framework. A full systems block diagram for this framework is given in Figure 2. 
3.0 Global scale dynamics of energy returns 
In its simplest possible form, EROI can be expressed as the ratio of energy returned to 
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In economics, returns are generally calculated using the net yield, whereas EROI analyses 
have used both net and gross energy yields depending on the system being studied (Brandt 
et al., 2013; King et. al., 2014). Here I will define EROI in terms of gross yield returned, 
because at the global scale, this is the primary energy flow, x. 
Unfortunately, in a system undergoing exponential growth, the energy flows in any particular 
year are a combination of the effects of all prior infrastructure investments (Garrett, 2014). 
However, we can overcome this complication by considering equation (4b) in the following 
annually sampled form  
( ) (1 ) ( 1) ( / ) ( 1)x t k x t x t       (7). 
Expressed in this way we have deliberately partitioned the endogenous growth dynamics 
driving the exponential increases in GPE (as detailed in equation (4b)) into annual energy 
inputs used to create infrastructure (the last term on the right-hand side of equation (7)), and 
the subsequent internal cycling and dissipation of that embodied energy in the form of 
infrastructure decay (the first term on the right-hand side of equation (7)). In structuring 
equation (4b) in this way, we have broken the feedback between x(t) and x(t - 1) that 
ultimately gives rise to the exponentiality of the system. Therefore, we can now explore how 
an investment input at t - 1 gives rise to future output returns, without the confounding 
effects of the implied feedback between x(t) and x(t - 1). 
The partitioning of the dynamics in equation (4b) into an input and an output of primary 
energy becomes clearer if we form the appropriate input-output relationship, or transfer 
function, which describes how energy investments in any one year translate into returns in 
the following year(s). Using the backward shift operator z-1 where z-1x(t) = x(t - 1), equation 
(7) can be written as the following annually sampled input-output relationship, 
1
/
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  (8). 
This transfer function is exactly what we want when defining global energy returns because it 
defines how the investment of energy in one year translates into energy returns in following 
years when isolated from the effects of exponential growth. 
From equation (8) the first thing to note is that all the primary energy flow input is used in 
one year to drive the primary energy flow outputs in the following years. This suggests from 
the outset that all energy use at the global scale is spoken for, and the concept of ‘net 
available’ energy flows that can be freely allocated within industrial society is an illusion. This 
is not to say that we do not find this energy use important, as clearly we do. But to consider 
a portion of it as available is to consider the things it would be used on as being somehow 
separated from energy acquisition/distribution/end-use activities, including the growth of 
these activities resulting from the creation of infrastructure. As argued for above, perhaps 
this is not the right way to see the use of energy, and it would be better to conceive of this as 
a genuinely integrated global system. In this context, what we value is not our ability to freely 
spend a residual of net available energy flows, but rather the entire use of the primary 
energy flow and its growth. 
In line with the discussion above, equation (8) also shows that η/λ, or 5 % yr-1, of the primary 
energy flow is translated directly into energy flows in the following year through the direct 
effect of an annual investment in infrastructure (see Figure 3). If one viewed this as the 
infrastructure investment for acquiring energy flows and we observe an output of x(t) in the 
following year, we would conclude that the system has a short-run (annual) EROI of 0.05-1 = 
20:1. Because this EROI estimate relates solely to short-run energy flows, it is akin to a 
power ratio (Herendeen, 2015). It is also close to average value of EROI quoted for 
conventional energy sources (Dale et al., 2012a). Standard EROI estimates do include 
running costs, do not include wider investments in the infrastructure, and do attempt to 
include all subsequent returns. Therefore, that the short-run EROI of the global energy 
system appears to mirror the long-run EROI of specific conventional energy sources is 
surprising. This suggests an equivalence between the proportion of energy invested in 
producing and running wider infrastructure that standard EROI estimates typically exclude, 
and the future energy returns from specific energy sources that they attempt to include. 
Clearly the short-run estimate of global EROI of 20:1 discussed above ignores the fact that 
the residual 95 % of primary energy use is also required to run this global system and, more 
importantly, that all subsequent returns of energy in following years need to be considered 
as identified in equation (6). In terms of equation (8), this is equivalent to the summation of 
all outputs of primary energy resulting from a unit input of primary energy at time t. The 
annual outputs of primary energy for a unit input is equivalent to the unit impulse response of 
equation (8). The reader can readily compute this for themselves using equation (7) by 
replacing the last term on the right hand side with (η/λ)(1) for t = 0 and (η/λ)(0) thereafter. 
For this the initial condition is x(0) = 0, η/λ = 0.05 yr-1 and k = 0.025 yr-1. This is shown in 
Figure 3. In year t = 1 x(t) is 5 % of the unit input reflecting the first year of output from the 
infrastructure investment. In subsequent years this decays at 2.5 % yr-1 as this infrastructure 
is slowly eroded by decay. 
The total output from the unit of investment is the sum of all annual outputs over time, which 
is also the EROI response over time, given that we have made a total input investment of 
one unit of primary energy at t = 0. This EROI rises from 0.05 in the first year, breaks even 
(EROI = 1) after ln(2)/k = 28 years, and rises to η/λ/k = 2 in equilibrium with a time constant 
of k-1 = 40 years. Therefore, at the global scale and over the full lifetime of any energy input, 
the EROI of the global energy system is 2:1 (Figure 3). Hereon I refer to this as the global 
EROI (EROIG = η/λ/k). 
EROIG parallels what has been previously referred to as ‘societal’ EROI (Hall et al., 2014), 
albeit at the global scale, in that it attempts to capture returns in relation to all energy uses, 
rather than those simply associated with a specific energy supply sub-system such as that 
for oil. Although an EROIG of 2:1 seems low given estimates of specific energy supply sub-
systems are up to an order of magnitude larger, it is still greater than one, reflecting a global 
system experiencing growth. What is probably more surprising for those familiar with EROI 
analyses is that an investment of primary energy only breaks even after just short of 30 
years. What this reflects is that current flows of primary energy are much more dependent on 
prior investments in infrastructure and the energy used to run it than present investments. As 
can be seen from Figure 3, investments made 40 years ago still contribute around one third 
(1-e-1) of present-day energy outputs, and those made 100 years ago still some 10 %. 
Qualitatively this is what we observe, where significant portions of industrial society that 
were constructed decades ago are still actively contributing to both the supply and demand 
for energy. 
It is interesting to note that solar photovoltaic systems appear to have recently approached 
grid parity with conventional electricity production and delivery systems in certain locations 
(Louwen et al., 2016) and this appears to have coincided with these systems now achieving 
30-year design lifetimes. This is in line with the result in Figure 3 which shows EROI 
breakeven occurs at ln(2)/k = 28 years at the global scale and hence any shorter design 
lifetime represents a technology unable to yield net returns to wider society. In contrast, 
somewhat surprisingly the EROI of solar photovoltaic systems appears to have remained 
somewhat static despite the significant improvements in efficiency and reductions in unit 
costs experienced over the last 30 years (Dale et al., 2012b). One would predict therefore 
that only when solar photovoltaic system design lifetimes reach 40 years, as appears to be 
the norm for large energy infrastructure (Davis et al., 2010), can it be considered a mature 
technology that will be ubiquitously invested in, hence becoming ‘conventional.’ 
 
4.0 The historic decline of global energy returns 
Much of industrial society was founded on energy dense fossil fuel sources, which provided 
large enough energy yields to overcome the relatively low efficiency, at that time, of 
converting these energy resources into useful work (Hall et al., 1986). However, it appears 
from some measures that the returns on these sources have since fallen steadily (Guilford et 
al., 2011). The reason often given for this is that society is exhausting the more easily 
acquired energy resources and hence has had to look to energetically less attractive 
resources (Guilford et al., 2011; Hall et al., 2014). There are two possible reasons for returns 
to fall in this context: First, the energy density of a source-type will decline over time as we 
consume the higher-quality, more energy-dense reserves first. Under these conditions 
progressively more energy is required to concentrate less-dense sources to useful levels. 
Secondly, we tend to exploit resources nearer to points of end-use first, before turning to 
resources further away. Under these conditions progressively more energy is required to 
relocate energy and its mass carrier in space to where it is needed. 
Although at first sight these two processes appear different, they can largely be seen as 
having the same effect on supply efficiency because in essence both processes involve 
relocating energy and its mass carrier in space. Furthermore, we can (and do) substitute one 
for the other when deciding which energy resource to exploit. Because of this, I argue one 
can explore observed declines in energy returns largely from the perspective of the effects of 
increases in the ‘size’ of industrial society on supply losses and hence declines in the supply 
efficiency of energy resources. As industrial society grows, environmental resources 
effectively become further away from points of end-use and hence the networks involved in 
the supply of these resources must be extended (Jarvis et al., 2015). This is not a linear 
process because as more finely divided resources are having to be distributed to ever more 
people, not only does the overall distance between the two increase, there are also 
disproportionate increases in energy loss in the terminal links between the two. This is 
known as the last mile problem in distribution networks (Rodrigue et al., 2009), and applies 
as much to the first mile as it does the last when considering environmentally-derived 
resources. 
Providing the average energy density of infrastructure is somewhat conserved (Garrett, 
2012), the space being occupied by industrial society increases proportionally with X. Jarvis 
et al., (2015) argue this increase in the physical size of industrial society requires extensions 
to existing acquisition/distribution networks, and that these extensions lead to increased 
energy loses due to more work having to be expended to move mass through these 
networks. Indeed, this can be seen as the primary motivation driving innovation on 
distribution technologies, although this can never overcome the effects of increasing path 
length (Banavar et al., 1999). In the current framework, this is equivalent to declining ηS as X 
and hence x increases. Figure 1ii suggests ηS has declined consistently since at least 1900, 
and if EROIG = η/λ/k at the global scale, then because ηS is a factor of η we should expect 
EROIG to experience similar dynamics as ηS all else remaining equal.  
Jarvis et al., (2015) explored the growth-induced declines in supply efficiency by analysing 
the scaling relationship between primary and final energy flows. Figure 1i inset shows this 
relationship for the De Stercke (2014) data. These data give xA x
 0.87 and, therefore, ηS x
-
0.13, i.e. ηS declines at 13 % the rate of growth of x or -0.3 % yr
-1 if r = 2.5 % yr-1. This is less 
than the -0.6 % yr-1 estimated by Jarvis et al., (2015) using the IEA data for the period 1970 
– 2010. This difference is partly, but not exclusively, explained by the fact that the De 
Stercke (2014) final energy data do not include losses attributed to mining, quarrying, fishing 
and agriculture, unlike the Jarvis et al., (2015) compilation. 
In exploring how variations in supply efficiency have impacted on EROIG we are paralleling 
what Hall et al., (2014) might refer to as ‘point-of-use’ EROI, because one is attempting to 
capture the effects of both acquisition and distribution losses on system performance. 
However, all else does not remain constant, other than the tendency for return rates to be 
conserved in the long-run and at the global scale. To preserve these return rates on energy 
use requires ηU and/or ηM be increased to offset any systemic declines in ηS. Figure 1ii 
suggests most of the declines in ηS are offset by increases in ηU given the product ηUηS is 
relatively stable at 0.23 ± 0.04. This suggests ηM has also been relatively constant 
throughout the period at the global scale. For this to be the case, the very substantial 
improvements in energy efficiency in many manufacturing processes that have occurred 
over the last 100 years would have to be offset by declining efficiency in other areas of the 
infrastructure manufacturing portfolio, presumably associated with the introduction of new 
infrastructure classes and their associated novel production processes. Assuming η is 
stationary and the long-run growth rate is specifically 2.7 % yr-1 in the De Stercke (2014) 
data, then η/λ = 2(2.7) % yr-1. Using the estimates of ηUηS shown in Figure 1ii, equation (5) 
gives us an estimate of ηM of 0.24 ± 0.04 i.e. industrial society is ~24 % efficient at 
translating final energy into infrastructure at the global scale. This suggests the variations 
about this figure presented in Fig. 1ii are largely the product of small variations in η/λ and/or 
the effects of data uncertainties. 
A popular narrative in the EROI literature is the notion of an ‘energy cliff’ where EROI falls to 
levels unable to support society as currently conceived (Murphy and Hall, 2011). An 
alternative and possibly better metaphor would be that any limits on efficiency improvements 
represent a thermodynamic ‘wall’ for growth. If growth causes systemic declines in ηS as I 
have argued, and we currently offset this diminishing return to scale by raising ηU, then it 
would be naïve to assume ηU could be raised without limit. As a minimum, ηU is limited by 
the Carnot efficiency of the system. Once such a limit was approached the long-run relative 
return rates of the global economy could not be preserved and growth would tend to become 
size-determined, as it is in most biological systems (West et al., 2001). It is not apparent how 
far we are from such limits, especially as it appears possible to raise ηU substantially through 
expansion of direct electricity production (wind, photovoltaic and other approaches), and 
combined heat and power. Furthermore, a global value for ηM of 24 % suggests substantial 
scope for raising this further as well. Clearly it would be very helpful to know what the 
thermodynamic limits of ηU and ηM were. 
The present issue is how fast industrial society needs to increase ηU (or ηM) in order to offset 
the declines in ηS and hence preserve growth. As stated earlier, the De Stercke (2014) data 
suggest that ηS x
-0.13, or supply efficiency is falling at ~0.3 % yr-1 if primary energy is 
growing at ~2.5 % yr-1. Therefore, in total ηU must be currently increasing at ~0.3 % yr
-1 to 
compensate for these growth-induced declines in supply efficiency. Clearly this is not 
particularly quick, which possibly explains why the uptake rate of innovations on energy 
saving is much slower than the available portfolio of innovations would suggest is possible or 
desirable (Department for Energy and Climate Change, 2013). It may also explain why it is 
very difficult to change this rate as policy often wishes to. 
 
5.0 Infrastructure turnover and historic variations of global energy 
returns 
Thus far I have largely considered the long run relative growth rate of the real economy as 
being constant around 2.5 % yr-1. However, as shown in Figure 1iii, the observed relative 
growth rate appears to have varied substantially and systematically over the past 100 years 
or more. If both r = η/λ - k (from equation (4)), and the overall efficiency, η, does not vary 
substantially (as discussed in Section 4), then the variations in r shown in Figure 1iii must be 
largely attributed to variations in the rate of infrastructure decay, k. Figure 1iii shows an 
estimate of these variations using the non-stationary estimates of r presented in Figure 1iii 
and the expression k = η/λ – r. Here, again I have assumed η/λ is equal to twice the long-run 
growth in GPE, or 0.05 yr-1. 
Figure 1iii is interesting in that it suggests that the observed ‘long wave’-like variations in the 
growth rate in GPE are the product of the rate at which infrastructure is removed from the 
global portfolio, rather than the rate at which it is added, as is commonly believed (e.g. 
Grubler et al., 1999). If we assume the ability of the environment to erode infrastructure is 
somewhat stationary over this >100-year interval, then these variations represent non-
stationarity in the timeframe over which people decide to collect returns from energy 
investments through active decommissioning of ‘old’ infrastructure. These timescales range 
from as low as ~0.04-1 = 25 years in the depths of the recessions that peaked in the 1930’s 
and 1990’s, to as much as ~0.01-1 = 100 years in the peak of the 1960’s boom. 
The more familiar narrative for describing long-wave dynamics is constructed around 
innovation-led nonlinear logistic episodes of growth (Grübler et al., 1999; Manoli et al., 
2016). The account of this behaviour I offer in terms of non-stationary rates of 
decommissioning of infrastructure is not incompatible with this, given that the removal of old 
technology is a prerequisite to populating the infrastructure portfolio with new technology. 
However, a nonlinear account of these observations, such as episodic logistics, could be 
accused of overcomplicating what appears to be an otherwise near-linear dynamic variation 
in the relative growth rate of GPE. For example, such behaviour could simply arise out of the 
implicit desire to maintain growth at some level, but with some lag associated with perceiving 
and responding to any deviations from this ideal. 
If EROIG = η/λ/k as proposed here, then the variations in k presented in Figure 1iii also have 
important implications for EROIG. Figure 1iv presents the estimated variations in EROIG 
assuming η/λ is equal to twice the long-run growth in GPE, and using the estimates for k 
presented in Figure 1iii. Not surprisingly, EROIG is low in the recessions centred in the 
1930’s and 1990’s when infrastructure lifetimes are low, and rises significantly in the 1960’s 
when infrastructure lifetimes are high. This is fully in line with expectation in terms of 
equation (6) because the lifetime of an energy investment determines the integration time for 
the total energy returns from that investment. Based on this I would argue that, providing 
actual infrastructure lifetimes are being used, any observed declines in EROI measures from 
the 1960’s onwards are likely to reflect the effects of declining infrastructure lifetime over this 
period to some extent. Of course, the real test for this will be whether EROI estimates are 
seen to increase significantly if the global economy enters another episode of above long-
run average growth as suggested could be happening by the GPE data in Figure 1.  
 
6.0 Summary and conclusion 
Because of the need to specify system boundaries EROI will remain a conceptually 
appealing yet difficult to specify parameter. This is particularly true when attempting to 
accommodate the effects of infrastructure investments and how returns from these accrue 
over time. Here I have argued that matters could be greatly simplified when analysing a 
largely undifferentiated global scale system because there are far fewer boundaries to 
consider. In doing so, although you sacrifice the ability to differentiate between sub-
components of this system, you are able to construct a much clearer picture of the global 
scale drivers for growth. 
The only differentiation I offered was to distinguish between the useful, supply and 
infrastructure manufacturing components of GPE, and by implication, the fraction of these 
components that are wasted. I attempted to show that a central feature of these components 
was a declining return-to-scale associated with growth-induced decreases in resource 
supply efficiency. However, the observed long-run exponential character of GPE suggests a 
strong tendency for the global economy to self-organise such that, overall, energy efficiency 
is preserved, and hence long-run net returns remain close to 2.5 % yr-1. I attempted to show 
this was associated with an EROIG of 2:1, realised with a time constant of 40 years and a 
break-even time of 28 years. 
The De Stercke (2014) data used here also reveal significant ‘wave-like’ variation in the 
relative growth rate of GPE about ~2.5 % yr-1. The apparent preservation of the overall 
efficiency of energy use implicates variations in the decommissioning/decay rate of 
infrastructure in these dynamics. This view is not incompatible with current thinking on 
innovation dynamics in the global economy, but points to a simple explanation focused on 
lags in any attempt to correct for deviations from ~2.5 % yr-1. This view is one where a 
certain level of growth is the economic objective, something that fits with the prevailing 
narrative around avoiding recessionary and inflationary episodes. In the absence of an 
obvious single controlling hand at the global scale, and in light of the heterogeneity in the 
global economy, this suggests such behaviour is truly emergent. 
The estimates of usefulness and manufacturing efficiencies suggest significant headroom is 
available for accommodating further declines in supply efficiency in order to preserve growth. 
Therefore, although we appear to be seeing the signs of declines in the growth opportunities 
of certain highly developed economies (e.g. Japan, Western Europe), it would also appear 
this is not the case globally and emerging economies like China and India look set to further 
consume this headroom. Indeed, if the GPE data are to be believed, real growth looks set to 
move above its long run value for the next two decades or more. However, at some point the 
system must hit its thermodynamic limits where there is no residual energy flow to invest in 
additional infrastructure, and hence EROIG = 1. The enhanced decay of infrastructure 
elicited by anthropogenic climate change should be a more pressing issue for those 
concerned about such things. 
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Table 1. Simple linear regressions results for the data shown in Figure 1i. All parameter 







ln(GPE) = a(t – t1) 
 
a = 0.027 ± 0.004 
t1 = 1775 ± 2.7 AD 
 
0.979 
ln(GWP) = a(t – t1) 
 
a = 0.031 ± 0.004 
t1 = 1887 ± 1.1 AD 
 
0.977 
ln(GFE) = aln(GPE) + c 
 
a = 0.8733 ± 0.0045 
c = 0.1289 ± 0.0224 
 
0.997 
ln(GUE) = aln(GPE) + c 
 
a = 1.2115 ± 0.0056 
c = -2.3066 ± 0.0281 
 
0.998 
ln(GWP) = aln(GPE) + c 
 
a = 1.1378 ± 0.010 




























































































































 Fig. 1 i. Global Primary Energy (GPE), Global Final Energy (GFE), Global Useful Energy 
(GUE) and Gross World Product (GWP), 1900 to 2014. All data are from De Stercke (2014), 
although total transport has also been subtracted from the GFE series (see text for 
explanation). The shaded areas are 95 % confidence intervals from the simple linear 
regression results reported in Table 1. The dashed lines are 95% confidence intervals 
associated with the smoothed GPE relative growth rates presented in iii. The inset shows the 
scaling relationships between GPE and GFE, GUE and GWP, with shaded areas again 
representing 95 % confidence intervals for the simple linear regression results reported in 
Table 1. ii. The supply efficiency, ηS, usefulness efficiency, ηU, and manufacturing efficiency, 
ηM, estimated from the data in i. (see text for explanation). Also shown is the product ηUηS. iii. 
The relative growth rate, r, of the GPE data shown in i. Also shown is the 95 % confidence 
interval of a fixed interval smoothed estimate of r, again made from the GPE data in i. The 
stationary estimate of 2.7 % yr−1 from the simple linear regression of these same data is 
shown as the dashed line for reference. iv. 95 % confidence interval for the non-stationary 
estimates of both the global aggregate decay rate of infrastructure, k, and EROIG (see text 
for explanation). 
  












 Figure 3. The impulse response of equation (8) showing how global energy outputs decay 
following a unit input of primary energy into the global economy (grey shaded area). Also 
shown is the cumulative energy output which, for the unit input case, represents the time 
evolution of EROIG (—) again following a unit input of primary energy. Also shown is the half 
time and time constant of the EROIG response where the impulse response has decayed by 
50 and 63 % respectively (vertical dashed lines). 
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